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RECENT CASES
of support imposable on defendant under that state's law,1" an
amendment was recommended in 1958 which permitted the respond-
ing state to treat a duly registered judgment as if locally issued.1
5
This amendment failed to accomplish its purpose, however, because
it is apparent that the effectiveness of the Uniform Support Act is
dependant upon the interpretation of the court in the responding
state. 26 Even the criminal extradition provisions of the Act, unsatis-
factory as they may be for providing support, are subject to judicial
interpretation.
If North Dakota's neighbors who do not impose the obligation
to support illegitimate children18 accept the reasoning of the Texas
court, it is evident that a father of an illegitimate child, although
obligated under North Dakota law to provide support,19 need not
be too inconvenienced to escape his obligation.
Considering that the common law rule has been abrogated in
other states by judicial construction 2° and that full faith and credit
has been extended to cover ambulatory judgments in other states
2'
and even in Texas in some cases, 22 the Texas court would have
made no radical variation from accepted practice. Leaving for leg-
islative enactment what has been accomplished elsewhere by judicial
construction is a dereliction of precedent. Judicial cognizance of
the social problem and public burden for which a remedy is sought
should be combined with the plenary powers of judicial interpreta-
tion and construction to give effect to this Uniform Support Act and
preclude Texas and others 23 from becoming havens for those who
wish to sow the seeds but avoid the tedium of nurturing the crop.
ROBERT STROUP
CRIMINAL LAW-NEW TRIAL-MISCONDUCT OF JuRY-The de-
fendant was convicted of petit larceny for obtaining money by an
unpaid check. He appealed for a new trial claiming misconduct
on the part of the jury. The affidavits of two jurors stated that
during their deliberation the jury foreman made many statements
to the jury in respect to his view that the defendant was guilty.
He stated that he had a stack of bad checks in his office and that
14. Duncan v. Duncan, 85 Ohio L. Abs. 522, 172 N.E.2d 478 (1961) ; contra, Wilson v.
Chumney, 214 Ga. 120, 103 S.E.2d 552 (1958) (responding state held proceedings of
initiating state res judicata).
15. 9C U.L.A. §§ 33-38 (Supp. 1964).
16. Clarke v. Blackburn, 151 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1963) ; Hardy v. Betz, 105 N.H. 169, 195
A.2d 582 (1963). The responding state refused extradition on grounds that defendant had
not been adjudged guilty of a crime under law of responding state.
17. Ibid.
18. E.g., Idaho, Michigan, Missouri and Montana.
19. N.id. CENT. CoDn § 32-36-01 (1960).
20. Supra notes 9, 10 and 11.
21. Supra note 4.
22. Supra note 6.
28. Op. cit. supra note 18.
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a stop must be put to such a practice. Later during the deliberation
the same juror explained that the defendant had previously been
in court. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the Consti-
tutional right to meet the witnesses face to face was not denied
the defendant and it was not shown that there was misconduct
on the part of the jury. Troglen v. State, 392 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn. 1965)
The majority of jurisdictions hold to the orthodox view that
the members of a jury may not give testimony so as to impeach
their verdict.1 The reasons given for such a decision as well as
the criticism 2 of such decisions are varied and voluminous.3  Sev-
eral states have modified the archaic rule to admit a juror's im-
peachment of his verdict.4 North Dakota has modified the rule
only to civil verdicts arrived at by chance.5
These jurisdictions which receive the testimony of a jury mem-
ber for the purpose of avoiding the verdict do so in a limited
fashion under the Iowa rule which limits this testimony to those
items that do not essentially inhere in the verdict itself.0 Under
this rule the motives, methods and mental processes by which the
jury reaches its decision inhere in the verdict,7 while the existence
of conditions of the occurrence of events bearing on the verdict
are proof of facts which will be admitted into evidence."
After the alleged misconduct on the part of the jury has been
admitted, the granting of a new trial is at the discretion of the
trial judge.9 Some courts categorically grant a new trial if there
is misconduct on the part of the jury, 10 while others hold that there
must be actual prejudice toward the defendant before a new trial
is granted."' Generally a new trial will not be granted unless the
fact alleged is based upon an observation, experience or idea unique
to that juror by virtue of his business, profession or social cir-
cumstance,'1 2 or is not part of the evidence admitted during the
trial." The court's reasoning in the principal case falls within this
generalization.
The right of the defendant to be confronted with the witness
against him in a judicial proceeding is a basic Constitutional right
1. E.g., Ramsey v. United States, 27 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1928); Brackin v. State, 31
Ala. App. 228, 14 So. 2d 383 (1943) ; State v. Graber, 77 N.D. 645, 44 N.W.2d 798 (1950).
2. McDonald & U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
3. E.g., Taylor v. State, 18 Ala. 466, 93 So. 78 (1922) ; State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J.
92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955); Sandoval v. State, 209 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. 1948).
4. E.g., State v. James, 198 Iowa 976, 200, N.W. 577 (1924) ; Galvin v. State, 46
Tenn. 283 (1869); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art 753 (1950).
5. N.D. It. Civ. P. 59 (b) (2) (1957) ; Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964)
State v. Graber, supra note 1.
6. Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Wright v. Illinois & Miss.
Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866); MODEL CODE: OF EVIDENCE rule 301 (1942).
7. State v. Lorenzy, 59 Wash. 308, 109 Pac. 1064 (1910).
8. State v. Kociolek, supra note 3.
9. State v. Jones, 357 P.2d 760 (Kan. 1960); State v. Cray, 31 N.D. 67, 153 N.W.
425 (1915).
10. State v. Koclolek, supra note 3; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC., supra note 4.
11. State v. Olds, 106 Iowa 110, 76 N.W. 644 (1898); State v. Robidou, 20 N.D. 518,
128 N.W. 1124 (1910); Kirkendoll v. State, 198 Tenn. 497, 281 S.W.2d 243 (1955).
12. See, e.g., Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1957) ; Rawlings v. State, 303 S.W.2d
799 (Tex. 1957).
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which has been extended to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment.15 The court in the principal case bypassed this Constitutional
issue by merely saying that the juror was not a witness. A contrary
opinion can be reached by viewing the juror's statement in the
light of his fellow jurymen. The statement that he had a stack of
bad checks in his office implied that at least one of these checks
was passed by the defendant. The later part of his testimony that
a stop must be put to this practice could have inferred that a
stop should be put to this particular defendant. A few well chosen
questions by defendant's counsel on cross-examination could have
brought out the truth that the juror was not speaking of the de-
fendant but of his customers in general.
An analogous situation arose in United States v. Douglas'6 where
two affidavits were attached to the information sent to the jury.
Each contained persuasive proof in support of the alleged charges.
The affidavits, however, had not been admitted into evidence during
the trial. The circuit court held that the submission to the jury
of the affidavits was a palpable infringement on the defendant's
Constitutional right to be confronted with the witness against him.
If the jury's deliberation under these circumstances is a violation
of the defendant's Constitutional rights, there is no logical reason
why a juror's adverse testimony should not come within the purview
of the Constitution. This is especially true in light of the United
States Supreme Court's recent decisions expanding the application
of an accused's Constitutional rights.17 The only remedy for such
misconduct is a new trial.
Allowing the defendant the right to confrontation in this situation
may burden the courts for at least a short period until judges become
accustomed to instructing juries on such matters. The difficulty
resulting from such confrontation, however, should not be an excuse
for refusing to improve the means of justice.
RICHARD WALL
13. State v. Wegener, 180 Iowa 102, 162 N.W. 1040 (1917); State v. Burton, 65 Kan.
704, 70 Pac. 640 (1902) : Briggs v. State, 207 Tenn. 253, 338 S.W.2d 625 (1960).
14. U.S. CONST. art. 6.
15. Pointer v. Texas, 85 Sup. Ct. 1065 (1965).
16. 155 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1946).
17. E.g., Escobedo v. Ill., 84 Sup. Ct. 758 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
